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This paper examines unemployed workers’ declared willingness to work
for a wage lower than the one warranted by their quali…cation. We analyze
which personal and economic characteristics determine this willingness and
how it changes as unemployment spells lengthen. Moreover, we also study
the in‡uence of this willingness on unemployment duration. The main results
are: (i) Young workers, those less educated and those living in regions with
high unemployment show a more positive attitude towards accepting lower
wages while married women with a working husband show more negative at-
titudes; (ii) The exhaustion of unemployment bene…ts has positive e¤ects in
the transition probability of the attitude from negative to positive; (iii) The
e¤ect of this attitude on the unemployment hazard rate is positive but only
marginally signi…cant which may be showing that this willingness is not only
re‡ecting the worker’s reservation wage but also some unobserved hetero-
geneity; (iv) The negative duration dependence of the unemployment hazard
rate is substantially reduced when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for.
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According to the standard job search theory, longer unemployment duration
entails an increasing probability of accepting job o¤ers. We may expect this
fact to pull the unemployment rate down. But this theoretical prediction is
suspected in a country like Spain, where the unemployment rate has been ex-
ceptionally high for a prolonged period, 20% on average in the past 10 years.
The persistence of high unemployment in Spain has drawn much attention
among policy makers and economists. Some studies have emphasized insuf-
…cient job creation from the labor demand side resulting in high structural
unemployment (Bentolila and Blanchard, 1990), and others have pointed to
the lack of worker mobility or other aspects on the labor supply side (Blan-
chard et al., 1995 or Ahn, de la Rica and Ugidos, 1999). We examine another
aspect of labor supply, unemployed workers’ willingness to work for a reduced
wage and its relationship with their unemployment duration in Spain.
In Ahn et al. (1999) it is shown that the willingness to move for work
is not sensitive to workers’ unemployment duration, suggesting the lack of
worker mobility as one of the underlying causes of Spanish unemployment. In
this paper we examine the worker’s ‡exibility in terms of the reservation wage.
We highlight how unemployed workers’ willingness to work for a reduced wage
changes with the duration of unemployment and also how this duration is
a¤ected by such willingness.
The willingness to work for a reduced wage can be considered as a reduced-
form variable which re‡ects the worker’s reservation wage. Therefore, accord-
ing to the standard job search theory, the willingness to work for a reduced
wage should increase with the duration of unemployment, given other things
constant along the unemployment spell, since reservation wages decrease with
2unemployment duration.1
We examine …rst which personal and economic characteristics a¤ect the
willingness and how it evolves along the unemployment spell. We also exam-
ine the in‡uence of this attitude on the worker’s probability of leaving unem-
ployment. It is likely that there exist some unobserved variables (income,
skills, ...) which can a¤ect both reservation wages (hence the willingness)
and unemployment duration. Therefore, in order to control for the possible
endogeneity of the willingness, we estimate jointly two processes: one for the
exit rate from unemployment and the other for the willingness.
Main …ndings are that young, less educated and those living in times or
regions of high unemployment are more willing to accept a reduced wage. In
the analysis of attitude changes, we …nd that the probability of changing atti-
tudes from negative to positive decreases with unemployment duration while
the exhaustion of unemployment bene…ts increases this transition probability.
Regarding the e¤ect of declared willingness on the probability of leaving
unemployment, we …nd a positive, but only marginally signi…cant, e¤ect. The
results suggest that the willingness variable is related not only to reservation
wages but also to some unobserved characteristics which render both a lower
unemployment hazard rate and lower willingness to work for a reduced wage.
Another interesting result of our study is that once we control for the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity, negative duration dependence in the probability
of leaving unemployment is substantially reduced, which is consistent with
some theoretical suspicions.2
We organize the paper as follows. First, we present the main theoretical
predictions which are relevant to the willingness to work for a reduced wage.
1See, among others, Mortensen (1986) or Van den Berg (1990) for this basic theoretical
prediction.
2This result contrasts to that found in Bover et al. (1997).
3Second, we describe the data used in our analysis and in the third section
we present the empirical results. In this section, we start by analyzing the
determinants of the willingness, and we highlight its relationship with unem-
ployment duration by estimating a model for the time it takes until initially
unwilling workers become willing to work for a reduced wage. Finally, we
estimate a model for the duration of unemployment as a function of, among
other variables, the expressed willingness. The last section presents the main
conclusions of the paper.
2 Theoretical background
First of all, it is important to describe clearly our variable of analysis. The
question we analyze is, when translated literally, “Are you willing to accept
a job o¤er with a wage inferior to the one adequate for your quali…cation?”
The answer to this question may be interpreted as a reduced-form variable
related to the reservation wage. However, the interpretation of the other part
of the question is not clear: What is the adequate wage for one’s quali…ca-
tion? Formally, we may write this willingness using the reservation wage,
wR(t), and the adequate wage for quali…cation, wa. The answer to the above
question will be yes if wR(t) <w a,a n dno otherwise.
In order to understand this question better we can use a standard non-
stationary search model.3 This model deals with the optimal stopping
decision an unemployed worker has to take when searching for a job. It as-
sumes that unemployed workers will accept any o¤er if its associated wage is
equal to or higher than their reservation wage. If the environment in which
the worker is searching is non-stationary, in the sense that some of the pa-
rameters which describe the market change over time, his reservation wage
3See Mortensen (1986) or Devine and Kiefer (1991) for extensive surveys of the litera-
ture.
4will also change over time. For example, if income or job o¤er frequency de-
creases with unemployment duration, the reservation wage will decrease as
well (see Van den Berg, 1990 or García-Pérez, 1998). Therefore, these models
provide us with one theoretical relationship between the duration of unem-
ployment and reservation wages: given other things equal, the probability
of observing wR(t) <w a increases with unemployment duration because the
reservation wage decreases. However, there is another element that a¤ects
the unemployed worker’s willingness. What is the perceived adequate wage
for her quali…cation, wa? It seems reasonable to assume that this is related
with the average wage received by workers with similar characteristics. If
this average o¤ered wage were not a¤ected by unemployment duration, we
should expect a greater willingness to work for a reduced wage over unem-
ployment duration. However, some factors, such as skill depreciation during
unemployment, could make workers adjust downward their wa as their un-
employment spells lengthen. Final e¤ects will depend on the magnitude of
each of these factors.
Reservation wages depend on the unemployed worker’s liquidity con-
straints and her expectations about future job o¤ers, as well as search costs.
Liquidity constraints depend on unemployment bene…ts and savings or accu-
mulated assets (empirical evidence is shown in Stancanelli, 1999). The bigger
the latter are the less likely is the worker to accept a job o¤er with a reduced
wage. Those with greater family responsibilities are likely to have lower
reservation wages. The composition of the household and each household
member’s situation, such as the presence of young children and the numbers
of working or unemployed members, are also likely to be relevant factors.
Also relevant are individual preferences for work, which are not observed but
may be captured by certain individual characteristics such as age, education
5and place of residence.
Reservation wages are also likely to be a¤ected by the extent of human
capital lost during unemployment spells. Those who face more rapid skill
depreciation while unemployed will be more willing to accept a reduced wage
o¤er. In this respect, occupation and educational level might be relevant
variables. The current economic situation and expectations about future
economic conditions also a¤ect one’s willingness to accept a reduced wage.
For example, during a recession, when o¤ers arrive less frequently, job o¤ers
are more likely to be accepted than during a period of expansion.
Finally, the willingness to work for a reduced wage will also depend on how
one’s future career and wage prospects are a¤ected by current wage levels or
employment status. It is likely that a low current wage may a¤ect future wage
prospects negatively if it operates as a negative signal to employers. This
may be more serious among occupations of high skill and high education, thus
making workers with these characteristics less willing to work for a reduced
wage.
3D a t a a n d v a r i a b l e s
The data used in this study are taken from the Spanish Labor Force Survey
(EPA) which is the main source of labor market information in Spain. This
survey is undertaken each quarter on about 60,000 households (about 200,000
individuals). One-sixth of the sample is replaced by new households each
quarter. Therefore a household, once chosen, is interviewed up to six times
over an interval of about 18 months.
I nt h e… r s tp a r to fa n a l y s i sw h e r ew ee x a m i n et h ed e t e r m i n a n t so ft h e
willingness to work for a reduced wage, we use pooled cross-section data over
the 17 quarters between 1992:1 and 1996:1. In the second and third part
6of analysis where we examine the relationship between the willingness and
unemployment duration, we construct individual longitudinal data from the
EPA’s rotating panel from 1992:1 to 1997:2. The individuals interviewed for
the …rst time in the …rst quarter of 1992 had their last interview in the second
quarter of 1993 and similarly, the last cohort of our sample was interviewed
from the …rst quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 1997. Thus, we capture
in our data set the last recession of the Spanish economy and the following
expansionary period.
We restrict our sample to those workers whose unemployment duration at
the time of the …rst interview is shorter than four months, mainly in order to
reduce the potential unobserved heterogeneity bias that could be contained
in the di¤erent unemployment duration observed at the start of interviews,
that is, the problem of left-censoring.
In our sample about 70% of responses to the willingness question were
a¢rmative, 20% negative and 10% indecisive. A …rst look at the responses
over time suggests that the willingness to work for a reduced wage is counter-
cyclical: during recessions unemployed workers are more willing to accept
lower wages than during periods of expansion.4
The dependent variable for the second part of the study is the duration,
in quarters, until initially unwilling workers become willing to work for a
reduced wage. That is, we estimate the hazard rate of changing the attitude
from negative to positive.
Finally, we study the e¤ects of the expressed willingness to work for lower
wages on unemployment duration. Since the willingness is endogenous with
respect to the probability of …nding a job, we jointly estimate two processes.
4According to the EPA, in 1992, when the unemployment rate was 17%, about 60%
of the unemployed were willing to work for lower wages. In 1995, the year with a 25%
unemployment rate, this proportion was over 75%.
74 Empirical results
4.1 Determinants of the willingness to work for lower
wages
In an empirical and reduced-form context, the willingness to work for a re-
duced wage can be speci…ed as a latent variable representing the di¤erence
between the reservation wage and the adequate wage for the worker’s quali…-
cation, wR(t)¡wa; and can be considered as a function of some explanatory
variables. However, what we really observe is a discrete outcome y; where,
in our case, y =1if an individual is willing to work for a reduced wage and
y =0otherwise. Assuming the extreme value distribution of the error term
in the speci…cation of this variable, we can estimate a logit model on it.5
Table 1 presents the results of this estimation.
(Table 1)
In this table we have the sample mean of each explanatory variable, es-
timated odds ratios and asymptotic t¡ratios of parameter estimates. The
model is estimated separately for the male and female samples to capture pos-
sible di¤erential e¤ects of explanatory variables by gender. The odds ratios
are interpreted as the relative probability corresponding to a unit increase in
each covariate. We now discuss some important results.
Family Characteristics: We have included a variable representing whether
the individual is the head of household, and also the head’s employment sta-
tus for non-heads. It does not show any signi…cant e¤ect among males, while
a wife whose husband is working is less willing to work for lower wages than
other females. This suggests that wives with an employed husband would
have higher reservation wages than those with an unemployed or inactive
5The results from estimating a probit model are basically the same. We prefer a logit
model just to compare the results with Ahn et al. (1999).
8husband. Other household characteristics, such as the household size, the
number of members in each labor market status and the number of children
of di¤erent ages in the family show no appreciable e¤ects.
Age and Education Level: As expected, young people (aged 16-19) are
more willing to work for lower wages and those aged 45 or more are much less
willing to accept a reduced wage. This downward in‡exibility of reservation
wages among old workers might re‡ect greater economic wealth or smaller
human capital loss due to a shorter remaining working life.
The e¤ect of education is very signi…cant. More educated workers are
much less willing to work for lower wages. This may re‡ect the labor demand
situation, that is, it is harder to …nd a job for low-educated workers, and that
signaling e¤ects (a lower current wage as lower ability) are stronger in the
job market for more educated workers.
Unemployment Bene…ts: Theory predicts lower willingness among those
receiving bene…ts than among non-receivers. However, although unemploy-
ment bene…ts show some negative e¤ects on the willingness to work for lower
wages, the e¤ect is not very signi…cant. This leads us to suspect the existence
of unobserved characteristics, such as experience, skill or sector, which may
be correlated with bene…t receipt.
Local Labor Market Conditions: As expected, the local unemployment
rate a¤ects positively workers’ willingness to work for lower wages. Those
living in a location with higher unemployment are more willing to work for
lower wages. However, the local vacancy rate and real wages do not show
any signi…cant e¤ects.
In summary, the results6 show that some individual characteristics, such
6In Ahn et al. (1999) a similar model is estimated for the willingness to move for work.
The results are similar in that the e¤ects of age and education are both very signi…cant
but the e¤ect of unemployment bene…ts is found insigni…cant.
9as age and education, a¤ect signi…cantly the workers’ willingness to accept a
reduced wage o¤er. On the other hand, unemployment bene…ts reduce only
marginally the willingness. This somewhat unexpected result may be due
to unobserved heterogeneity which cannot be controlled in cross-sectional
data. In the next section we will use longitudinal data to control for such
heterogeneity.
4.2 E¤ects of unemployment duration on the willing-
ness to work for a reduced wage
In Spain, where the proportion of long-term unemployed has been above or
close to 50% during the past decade, one of the most interesting factors we
can consider in examining the willingness to work for lower wages is the du-
ration of unemployment spells. Lengthening unemployment may a¤ect both
the reservation wage, wR(t); and the perceived adequate wage for her quali-
…cation, wa.A saw o r k e rs t a y su n e m p l o y e dl o n g e r ,s h ei sm o r el i k e l yt oh a v e
exhausted unemployment bene…ts as well as other income sources. This is
likely to lower the reservation wage, and therefore to increase the willingness
to accept a reduced wage. On the other hand, perceived adequate wage, wa,
could also be adjusted downward as the unemployment spell lengthens due
to, for example, the worker’s skill depreciation. Hence, it is not clear how the
duration of unemployment a¤ects the willingness to work for lower wages.
However, we may expect the e¤ect on reservation wages to be greater than
the other e¤ect, therefore leading to a greater willingness to work for lower
wages the longer the duration of unemployment.
First, we examine the relationship between the willingness and unem-
ployment duration using cross-section data. Table 2a shows a simple cross-
tabulation between unemployment duration and the willingness obtained
from the cross-section Spanish Labor Force Survey for 1992-1996. The result
10indicates no variation in the willingness by unemployment duration. This
leads us to suspect the existence of uncontrolled heterogeneity among unem-
ployed workers by unemployment duration which a¤ects both the willingness
and the duration.
Now, using a longitudinal data set, we control for unobserved individual
e¤ects to obtain more robust results on the e¤ect of unemployment duration
on the willingness to work for lower wages. In the Spanish Labor Force Survey
individuals are interviewed six times (every three months over a period of one
and a half years), allowing us to examine unemployed workers’ willingness
as their unemployment duration lengthens. For example, for those who are
unemployed for two consecutive quarters, we can examine the variation of
the willingness as their unemployment duration increases by three months.
For the group of people who are unemployed over the entire interview period
(six quarters), we can examine how the willingness changes as the duration
of unemployment increases by about 15 months (time elapsed between the
…rst and the sixth interview).
Table 2b shows how the willingness to work for lower wages changes as
the duration of unemployment increases. All individuals in the sample were
unemployed for up to 3 months at the time of their …rst interview. We divide
the sample into subgroups, each of them in a di¤erent column, according to
the period when individuals become employed or go out of the labor force,
including a group of workers who stay unemployed over the entire time period
of six interviews.
(Table 2a and 2b)
One conclusion which can be drawn from Table 2b is that the willing-
ness indeed increases with unemployment duration. However, the increase
is modest. For example, an increase by three months in the spell’s duration
11raises the proportion willing to work for lower wages only by 2 percentage
points. The largest increase is observed among those who are unemployed
during all 6 quarters interviewed (last column of Table 2b). The proportion
of workers willing to work for lower wages increases from 64 percent to 80
percent over a 15 months interval, a quarterly increase by about 3 percentage
points. This relatively small sensitivity of workers’ willingness to work for
lower wages with respect to unemployment duration is matched by equally
insensitive willingness to move for work as found in Ahn et at. (1999). We
can think of a few reasons for this lack of worker ‡exibility.
First, one might think that the responses to the question as posed in
the survey could be completely random.7 In this case, individuals’ re-
sponses would not depend on the duration of unemployment nor on their
past responses. The second hypothesis is that the lack of variation with un-
employment duration might take place because the individuals’ attitude is
very rigid. Maybe the attitude just does not change for whatever reason.
People might maintain the same attitude regardless of their unemployment
duration. In this case, the conditional probability of showing a positive or
negative attitude at period t+1 would be, respectively, zero or one depending
completely on the attitude shown in period t.
Both hypotheses are rejected by the transition matrix shown in Table 3
although it appears that there is a strong persistence in attitudes over time.
This persistence is particularly strong among those with a positive attitude:
those who show a positive attitude in one period are very likely to show the
same attitude in subsequent periods. However, it seems that the attitude
7It should be kept in mind that in order to collect information on every household
member the interviewer asks questions about all household members to those adults who
happen to be at home at the time of the interview. This means that the information about
willingness for some individuals in the survey may be based on other household members’
opinion.
12for those with a negative attitude is not totally …xed. In our sample about
20 percent of the unemployed workers with a negative attitude changed it
to positive over a period of three months. These patterns are consistent
with a theoretical prediction that the worker’s reservation wages are likely
to decrease with the duration of unemployment.
(Table 3)
One can think of many factors that can contribute to changing individ-
uals’ attitudes over time. As stated before, with lengthening unemployment
duration people might run out of economic resources, which makes them more
willing to work for lower wages. On the other hand, as unemployment spells
lengthen, people somehow …nd ways to live without a formal job. For ex-
ample, if the probability of operating in the underground economy increases
with unemployment duration, job o¤ers with lower wages become less attrac-
tive (Ahn and de la Rica, 1997), and if these workers are likely to classify
themselves as unemployed in the survey, this could lead to an increase in
the proportion of negative attitudes as the duration of unemployment in-
creases. It is also possible that the preferences for work or leisure change as
one spends more time unemployed. Unfortunately, in our data set we do not
have much information about changes in individuals’ economic situation or
in their preferences.
One variable that is available for our analysis is individual status re-
garding unemployment bene…ts each quarter. We observe whether or not
unemployed workers received unemployment bene…ts at the time of each in-
terview. The exhaustion of unemployment bene…ts is likely to lead to a
sudden (although anticipated) drop in …nancial resources, and is likely to
increase individuals’ willingness to work for lower wages.8 Comparing the
8Many studies have found a signi…cantly higher job-…nding probability after the ex-
haustion of unemployment bene…ts. See, for example, Meyer (1990) for the US and Ahn
13attitude of those who exhaust their unemployment bene…ts at some point be-
tween two periods with those who continue receiving them, we can examine
the importance of economic means in workers’ willingness to work for lower
wages. A univariate comparison of the proportions changing their attitude
from negative to positive between two consecutive quarters by the unem-
ployment bene…t status shows virtually no di¤erence (23% among those who
receive bene…ts in both quarters and 24% among those who exhaust them
between the two quarters). This result warrants a multivariate analysis.
Our sample consists of those workers who begin their unemployment spell
unwilling to work for lower wages. We will study how the hazard rate that
initially unwilling workers become willing to accept lower wages. As in any
duration analysis, the estimation sample consists of two types of observations:
completed and censored spells. Those who have a completed spell are the
unemployed workers who change their answer from negative to a¢rmative
during the subsequent unemployed periods observed in the survey, while
the censored observations are those who have not changed their attitude
from negative to positive during the observed unemployment spell. The
sample characteristics are presented in Table 4. There is a high percentage
of censoring, which is due to four di¤erent reasons: …nding a job (33.2%) or
leaving the labor force (26.3%) while having a negative attitude, changing it
from negative to indecision (10.2%) or no response to the question (10.2%).
(Table 4)
T h em e t h o do fe s t i m a t i o ni sb a s e do nd i s c r e t eo rg r o u p e dd u r a t i o nm o d e l s
(see Lancaster, 1990). The reasons for using discrete-time techniques are not
only that the data are observed in discrete intervals, namely in quarters, but
also that these techniques are much more ‡exible for estimating the time-
and Ugidos (1995) for Spain, or Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) for a survey.
14dependence of the hazard rate (see Meyer, 1990). We estimate the hazard
rate for the duration, TR; until initially unwilling unemployed workers become
willing to work for lower wages. The hazard rate is the following conditional
probability, using a normal distribution for its estimation:
hR(t;b(t);y(t)) = Pr(TR = t j TR ¸ t;b(t);y(t))
=© [ °0(t)+°1(t)b(t)+°2(t)y(t)]
where, b(t) is the binary indicator of whether the individual still has un-
employment bene…ts in period t or not, and y(t) is a vector of, possibly,
time-varying variables. The °i(t) are time-varying parameters. Once the
likelihood function is accordingly written, one can estimate the model using
maximum likelihood techniques.9
In Table 5, we have the estimation results of this hazard rate. The …rst
result emerging from this table is the strong negative duration dependence in
the hazard rate in spite of the inclusion of many variables which are supposed
to capture individual heterogeneity. The time dependence of the hazard rate
is estimated here with dummy variables (Dur2, ...), one for each possible
duration, the duration of one quarter being absorbed in the constant term.
For the mean values of all the explanatory variables, we obtain a predicted
hazard which decreases by more than 10 percentage points through the …ve
quarters studied.
This result can be connected to the recent theoretical debate of whether
there exists stigma or skill depreciation e¤ects on unemployment causing
a lower exit rate as the unemployment spell lengthens.10 The basic idea
9A discrete duration hazard rate can be seen as a sequence of binary choice equations
(with cross-equation restrictions) de…ned on the surviving population at each duration.
See Jenkins (1995) for a very clear explanation of these techniques.
10For this question, see Omori (1997). Di¤erent models about stigma e¤ects are in
15applied to our problem is that if only stigma e¤ects are present (a longer un-
employment spell signalling a bad quality), the reservation wage, but not wa,
will be adjusted downward with lengthening unemployment. Therefore, the
probability of changing the attitude increases with unemployment duration.
On the other hand, if skill depreciation e¤ects are also present, the perceived
adequate wage, wa; will also be adjusted downwards. Hence, depending on
the magnitude of both e¤ects, the probability of changing the attitude will
decrease or increase. This may be the driving force in our results above:
skill depreciation is high during unemployment so that the perceived ade-
quate wage decreases as fast as their reservation wage, and, therefore, the
probability of attitude change decreases with unemployment duration.
(Table 5)
The strong negative duration dependence, however, could be also due to
the presence of some heterogeneity that we do not observe. Some important
unobserved variables are family income and the duration of unemployment
bene…t entitlement. In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity the neg-
ative duration dependence is likely to be overestimated and, furthermore,
estimated parameters could be biased. An additional bias may arise due to
the endogeneity of the bene…t receipt in the case that some common un-
observed factors a¤ect both the hazard rate and the unemployment bene…t
status. These problems require an adequate consideration of unobserved
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of unemployment bene…t status.11 We
correct these problems by including a discrete distribution function for this
heterogeneity. The results, however, are not a¤ected by the inclusion of this
Vishwanath (1989), Berkovitch (1990) or Blanchard and Diamond (1994). A model of
skill depreciation can be seen in Pissarides (1992).
11See Bover et al. (1997) for an explanation of these facts and of the estimation technique
used here which is based, basically, on the mixture technique developed by Heckman and
Singer (1984).
16heterogeneity.
With respect to other explanatory variables, we …nd a large e¤ect of
education: better educated workers are less likely to change their attitude
from negative to positive. However, the interaction of this variable with
duration is positive and signi…cant, thus provoking the e¤ect to change over
time: those with a high education are more willing to accept lower wages
when they are in unemployment for more than 9 months (see Figure 1).
The e¤ect of age is similar to that of education but less strong and signif-
icant: although in the …rst quarter younger workers have a lower probability
of changing attitude, afterwards they are more likely than older workers.
The only household characteristic which shows a signi…cant e¤ect is whether
t h es p o u s ew o r k so rn o t :t h o s ew h o s es p o u s ei sw o r k i n gh a v eam u c hl o w e r
probability of changing attitude and this result does not change by gen-
der, which contrasts with the result of the previous analysis with the pooled
cross-section data.
One important variable in this study is whether the worker receives un-
employment bene…ts or not. It is obtained that those individuals with unem-
ployment bene…ts are much less likely to change their attitude from negative
to positive (see Figure 2).
Finally, we also obtain a higher probability of attitude change from nega-
tive to positive in periods of recession or in regions where the unemployment
rate is higher.
In summary, the results give some support to the hypotheses derived from
the standard job search theory, in particular, the negative e¤ects of unem-
ployment bene…ts and the economic situation, and the positive e¤ects of the
local unemployment rate. The strong negative duration dependence suggests
that those who begin their unemployment spells with a negative attitude
17are increasingly less likely to change their attitude over their unemployment
spells. This result could be suggesting that reservation wages decrease more
rapidly at the beginning of the spell than later.
4.3 E¤ects of the willingness to work for lower wages
on unemployment duration
Once the dynamics of the expressed willingness to work for lower wages and
its evolution along the spell of unemployment have been analyzed, we turn
to the reverse causation. If this willingness is related to reservation wages,
there must be some in‡uence of this variable on unemployment duration.
In standard job search models the exit probability from unemployment is
the (instantaneous) probability of receiving an o¤er times the probability of
this o¤er being acceptable, that is, the o¤ered wage being larger than the
reservation wage. Numerous studies have estimated the hazard rate of leaving
unemployment for the Spanish workers.12 In this section, we highlight the
e¤ect of a new variable, the expressed willingness to work for lower wages,
on the worker’s unemployment duration. If the willingness to work for lower
wages is negatively related with reservation wages, we should expect higher
exit probability among those with a positive attitude than others. It is,
however, likely that the willingness also depends on the frequency of o¤ers one
receives (more o¤ers, less willing to work for a reduced wage). The ultimate
result depends on the magnitude of each e¤ect. We also have to remember the
presence of unobserved characteristics (income, skills, ...) which can a¤ect
both the worker’s probability of leaving unemployment and the willingness.
To take this into account, we will estimate jointly the hazard of leaving
unemployment and a process for the willingness indicator, and at the same
12Some examples are Ahn and Ugidos (1995), Cebrián et al. (1996), Bover et al. (1997)
or García-Pérez (1997).
18time we consider in both equations the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in this estimation, we
adopt a modi…ed Heckman and Singer (1984) technique.13 We introduce a
di¤erent heterogeneity term in each process: ´ in the unemployment hazard
rate and À in the willingness indicator equation. Each unobserved hetero-
geneity variable is assumed to have a distribution characterized by two mass
points and their expected values are assumed to be zero for identi…cation.
They follow a bivariate distribution which allows di¤erential e¤ects of unob-
served heterogeneity between the two processes. Hence, the two equations
to be estimated are:
hu(t;´)=P r ( Tu = t j Tu ¸ t;b(t);x(t);r(t;À);´)
=© [ '0(t)+'1(t)b(t)+'2(t)x(t)+'3(t)r(t;À)+´]
r(t;À)=P r ( Tr = t j Tr ¸ t;b(t);z(t);À)
=© [ ¯0(t)+¯1(t)b(t)+¯2(t)x(t)+À]
The hazard of leaving unemployment, hu(t;´); depends not only on unem-
ployment duration, Tu; observed heterogeneity, b(t) and x(t); and the willing-
ness indicator, r(t;À); but also on unobserved heterogeneity, ´. The willing-
ness depends on the duration of unemployment, Tr, observed heterogeneity,
and unobserved heterogeneity, À: As stated before, we specify a bivariate dis-
tribution for the two unobserved components, ´ and À,e a c ho ft h e mw i t ht w o
possible values. Given the assumption of zero expected value, we estimate
four parameters: ´1 and p for the heterogeneity term in the unemployment
duration equation and À1 and q in the willingness indicator equation. The
13This approach has been developed in the 1999’s version (See
ftp://ftp.cem….es/pdf/papers/sb/dur2.pdf) of Bover et al. (1997).
19likelihood function will be the sum over the bivariate distribution for these
two variables of the likelihood for each worker in the sample. Finally, the
'i(t) and ¯i(t) are time-varying parameters to be estimated.
We use a sample of Spanish workers who have been unemployed between
1992 and 1997. The main characteristics of the estimation sample are in Table
6. We also show Kaplan-Meier estimates in Table 7. The unemployment
duration is measured in quarters since we have only quarterly information on
the willingness. In Table 7 we can see that the exit rate from unemployment
is larger for individuals without unemployment bene…ts and for those who
are willing to accept lower wages.
(Table 6, 7)
Now we turn to the estimation results shown in Table 8. The estimated
hazard is decreasing with unemployment duration14 and it is higher for
workers without unemployment bene…ts. We also …nd larger hazard rates
for males and during the periods of expansion. However, we …nd some un-
expected results. For example, it seems that more educated workers have
lower probabilities of leaving unemployment and that those living in regions
with higher unemployment rates have a higher hazard rate. The e¤ect of the
willingness indicator is positive but only marginally signi…cant.
With respect to the willingness process, we obtain a rapidly decreasing
probability of positive attitude as unemployment spells lengthen. This result
can be interpreted in light of the previous discussion regarding stigma versus
skill depreciation e¤ects. The strong negative duration dependence suggests
a dominance of the e¤ects of skill depreciation over the e¤ects of decreasing
reservation wages along the unemployment duration.
14The e¤ect of unemployment duration is captured here by its absolute level. Di¤erent
speci…cations have been tried, including one with dummies for each possible duration. The
speci…cation shown is the best in terms of likelihood function and standard errors of the
coe¢cients.
20(Table 8)
The other interesting result is that, once we control for unobserved het-
erogeneity and endogeneity of the willingness indicator (the results without
control in Appendix A), we obtain a huge reduction in the duration depen-
dence of the unemployment hazard rate. This result con…rms the theoretical
suspicion that the negative duration dependence is overestimated when un-
observed heterogeneity is not controlled for. With the technique used to
estimate unobserved heterogeneity, we identify four groups of workers among
which there exists one group with an estimated 12% joint probability, p£q; of
having much lower probabilities of exiting unemployment and of changing the
attitude, opposite to a group with a 39.3% joint probability, (1¡p)£(1¡q);
of having a much higher probability of both exiting from unemployment and
changing the attitude.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined unemployed workers’ expressed willingness
to accept a job with a wage lower than the one adequate for their quali…cation,
and its relationship with the duration of unemployment in Spain. According
to job search models, reservation wages decrease as the unemployment spell
lengthens. Therefore, one should observe unemployed workers to be more
willing to accept lower wages as their spells become longer.
First, we analyzed which personal and economic characteristics determine
the willingness to work for a reduced wage using pooled cross-section data.
The main results are that young workers, those less educated and those living
in regions with high unemployment rates show a more positive attitude to-
wards accepting lower wages while the college educated and married women
with a working husband show substantially more negative attitudes. Unem-
21ployment bene…ts seem to have no e¤ects. However, there may be important
unobserved factors which warrants the analysis of longitudinal data in order
to control for individual heterogeneity.
In the second part, we studied the duration until one changes her attitude
from negative to positive by using a discrete-time duration model. The main
results are that the hazard rate of attitude change shows a strong negative
duration dependence. On the other hand, the exhaustion of unemployment
bene…ts indeed shows signi…cant positive e¤ects in the transition probability
o ft h ea t t i t u d ef r o mn e g a t i v et op o s i t i v e .
Regarding the e¤ects of this attitude on the exit probability from un-
employment, we …nd that the expressed willingness to work for lower wages
has only a marginally signi…cant positive e¤ect on the exit probability from
unemployment. With respect to stigma versus skill depreciation e¤ects on
the length of unemployment spells, our results suggest that the e¤ect of skill
depreciation is very important.
Another interesting result is that the negative duration dependence in
the unemployment hazard rate is indeed reduced once the e¤ect of the unob-
served heterogeneity is correctly taken into account. That is, with this type
of subjective variables, we can capture better the unobserved heterogeneity
present in these data sets.
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25Table 1
Logit Regression for Willingness Attitude (Yes=1; No=0)
(Data: Pooled Cross-Section EPA 1992:I-1996:I)
Males (N=5,023) Females (N=3,233)
Variable Mean Odds Ratio Mean Odds Ratio
Spouse, head works 0.26 0.61 (2.42)
Spouse, head unemp. 0.09 1.08 (0.31)
Spouse, head inactive 0.03 0.94 (0.21)
Child, head works 0.23 0.97 (0.16) 0.28 1.07 (0.26)
Child, head unemp. 0.06 0.73 (1.50) 0.05 0.98 (0.06)
Child, head inactive 0.22 1.29 (1.76) 0.18 1.15 (0.56)
Others 0.06 1.06 (0.30) 0.04 0.73 (1.01)
Age 16-19 0.13 1.30 (1.74) 0.17 1.43 (2.03)
Age 20-24 0.22 0.96 (0.35) 0.26 1.01 (0.04)
Age 25-29 0.22 1.01 (0.13) 0.22 1.00 (0.03)
Age 45+ 0.15 0.58 (3.83) 0.08 0.64 (2.11)
No Education 0.12 1.35 (2.18) 0.09 1.21 (1.00)
Primary Education 0.37 1.03 (0.38) 0.22 1.22 (1.56)
Vocational Education 0.11 0.92 (0.67) 0.16 0.75 (2.27)
Jr. College Education 0.02 0.48 (3.31) 0.06 0.37 (5.73)
University Education 0.03 0.27 (6.76) 0.06 0.53 (3.36)
Receiving Unempl. Bene…ts 0.36 0.83 (1.46) 0.23 0.81 (1.48)
Only Registered 0.53 1.08 (0.67) 0.61 1.06 (0.48)
Household Size 4.41 1.08 (1.36) 4.28 0.96 (0.62)
#w o r k e r s 0.77 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 1.19 (1.73)
# unemployed 1.57 1.09 (1.04) 1.49 1.22 (1.77)
#i n a c t i v e 1.23 0.87 (1.76) 0.91 0.99 (0.10)
Children 0-6 years 0.15 0.85 (1.53) 0.18 1.12 (0.89)
Children 7-15 0.32 0.92 (1.10) 0.34 1.06 (0.55)
Children 16-21 0.22 0.97 (0.38) 0.18 1.10 (0.89)
Log Unemp. Rate 2.95 1.57 (3.19) 2.90 1.52 (2.56)
Log Vacancy Rate 3.60 1.08 (0.45) 3.56 1.29 (1.26)
Log Real Wage 6.73 1.57 (0.85) 6.73 1.00 (0.00)
MODEL CHI-SQUARE 312.53 196.63
Notes: Unsigned asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Also included (but
not reported) are region and year dummies. The reference category is
a head of household with secondary education and aged 30 to 45.
26Table 2a
Workers Willing to Work for a reduced wage by Unemployment
Duration
(Pooled Cross-Section EPA 1992:II-1996:II)
Unemployment Duration (in months) 0-5 6-11 12-23 24-35
Proportion (%) willing 59.4 59.2 59.2 61.5
Table 2b
Workers Willing to Work for a reduced wage by Unemployment
Duration (Longitudinal EPA 1992:I-1996:II)
Number of Quarters Unemployed
(starting from the 1st interview)
Answer in the ith Interview
123 4 5 6
1st 75.4 69.9 67.7 66.4 62.1 63.9
2nd 69.6 70.2 68.4 63.6 67.1
3rd 71.7 68.7 65.2 68.5
4th 72.3 70.7 68.8
5th 70.9 71.6
6th 79.6
Average 75.4 69.8 68.9 69.9 66.5 69.9
Observations 3,084 1,801 1,299 699 472 1,706
27Table 3
Transition Matrix Over Three Months Intervals
(Data: Longitudinal EPA 1992:I - 1996:I.)
Attitude in the Second Interview
Attitude in the First Interview
Positive Negative
Positive 1,758 (94%) 108 (6%)
Negative 121 (21%) 459 (79%)
28Table 4
Main Characteristics of the Sample for the Change-of-attitude
Duration Analysis (percentages in brackets)







Age 16-19 55 (13.85) 187 (11.86)
Age 20-24 90 (22.67) 383 (24.31)
Age 25-29 71 (17.88) 277 (17.64)
Age 30-45 109 (27.45) 459 (29.12)
Age 45+ 72 (18.13) 269 (17.06)
No Education 98 (24.68) 427 (27.10)
Primary Education 182 (45.84) 672 (42.64)
Vocational Education 74 (18.64) 265 (16.88)
Jr. College Education 23 (5.79) 109 (6.98)
University Education 20 (5.04) 101 (6.43)
Male 234 (58.94) 967 (61.36)
Spouse working 40 (10.07) 212 (13.45)
Spouse unemployed 113 (28.46) 406 (25.76)
Spouse inactive 244 (61.46) 958 (60.78)
With bene…ts 147 (37.02) 588 (37.31)
TOTAL 397 1,576
29Table 5
Estimation of the Change-of-attitude Hazard Rate
with Endogenous Unemployment Bene…ts




Dur 2 -0.503 5.33
Dur 3 -0.687 4.77
Dur 4 -1.083 4.91
Dur 5 -1.345 4.89
High Education -0.352 2.09
Duration£High Education 0.142 1.79
Young -0.223 1.87
Duration£Young 0.098 1.63
Spouse Working -0.330 1.78





Regional Unempl. Rate 0.014 3.10
Second Quarter -0.014 0.16
Third Quarter 0.194 2.36






Estimation of the Change-of-attitude Hazard Rate
with Endogenous Unemployment Bene…ts
(controlling for unobserved heterogeneity)
Process for Bene…ts Receipt
Parameter Coe¢cient t-ratio
Constant -1.589 7.37
Dur 2 1.271 12.64
Dur 3 1.458 10.32
Dur 4 1.455 8.40
Dur 5 0.977 5.68
Low Education 0.129 1.79
Young -0.132 1.61
With experience 1.550 8.45
Male 0.240 2.93
4GDP 0.036 1.26
4 Regional Unempl. Rate 0.028 1.37
# unemployed -0.055 1.23
Children 0-6 years -0.147 2.47
Household Size 0.032 1.53
Spouse -0.286 2.58
Son -0.633 6.18
Other relative -0.489 3.30
Note : Log-likelihood = -2,732.55, Number of observations = 4,050.
31Table 6
Main Characteristics of the Sample for the Unemployment
Duration Analysis (percentages in brackets)







Age < 30 2,859 (13.85) 2,326 (56.44)
Age 30-45 1,352 (22.67) 1,272 (30.87)
Age 45+ 623 (17.88) 523 (12.69)
No Education 1,489 (30.80) 1,058 (25.67)
Primary Education 2,283 (47.23) 1,791 (43.46)
Vocational Education 684 (14.15) 752 (18.25)
Jr. College Education 237 (4.90) 313 (7.59)
University Education 141 (2.92) 207 (5.02)
Males 3,377 (68.86) 2,325 (56.42)
Spouse working 723 (14.96) 555 (13.46)
Spouse unemployed 928 (19.20) 1,075 (26.08)
Spouse inactive 3,183 (65.85) 2,491 (60.45)
With bene…ts 2,083 (43.09) 1,750 (42.46)
Willing to accept 3,201 (66.22) 2,830 (68.67)
TOTAL 4,834 4,121
32Table 7
Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates for the Duration in Unemployment
(percentages)
Quarter Sample With Without Willing Not willing
Unempl. Bene…ts Unempl. Bene…ts to accept to accept
1 23.35 18.86 26.71 23.55 23.07
2 20.09 18.53 21.22 20.82 18.66
3 20.31 20.01 20.49 21.32 17.96
4 14.46 15.16 14.10 15.05 12.95
5 11.85 12.48 11.57 12.55 9.89
33Table 8
Estimation of the Unemployment Hazard Rate
with Endogenous Willingness Indicator





Without Studies 0.245 5.03
Incompleted Primary Education 0.217 4.83





Regional Unempl. Rate 0.005 2.51
4Regional Unempl. Rate -0.022 2.62
Second Quarter 0.036 1.28
Third Quarter -0.001 0.01






Estimation of the Unemployment Hazard Rate
with Endogenous Willingness Indicator
(controlling for unobserved heterogeneity)





Without Studies 0.424 5.26
Incomplete Primary Education 0.273 3.62
Complete Primary Education 0.279 3.29
Age < 30 0.295 4.28
Age 30-45 0.294 4.09
4GDP 0.083 6.66
Regional Unempl. Rate 0.036 10.30
# unemployed without bene…ts 0.048 1.77
Spouse unemployed 0.191 2.92
Second quarter -0.074 1.59
Third quarter -0.125 2.59






Note : Log-likelihood = -20,042.7, Number of observations = 24,369. The




Estimation of the Unemployment Hazard Rate
and the Willingness Indicator





Without Studies 0.191 5.25
Incompleted Primary Education 0.175 5.14





Regional Unempl. Rate 0.004 2.77
4Regional Unempl. Rate -0.015 2.25
Second Quarter 0.033 1.30
Third Quarter -0.003 0.13
Fourth Quarter -0.091 3.51
Note : Log-likelihood = -11,783.01, Number of observations = 24,369. The
reference category is an unemployed worker with secondary or more
studies.
36Table A1 (Cont.)
Estimation of the Unemployment Hazard Rate
and the Willingness Indicator
(without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity)





Without Studies 0.246 5.74
Incomplete Primary Education 0.161 4.09
Complete Primary Education 0.139 3.08
Age < 30 0.145 3.95
Age 30-45 0.150 3.89
4GDP 0.053 7.97
Regional Unempl. Rate 0.021 11.79
# unemployed without bene…ts 0.051 2.97
Spouse unemployed 0.116 2.76
Second quarter -0.062 1.96
Third quarter -0.057 1.81
Fourth quarter 0.024 0.79
Spouse -0.092 1.66
Note : Log-likelihood = -8,419.57, Number of observations = 14,482. The
reference category is an unemployed worker with secondary or more
studies.
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